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Abstract
This paper considers the optimal portfolio selection problem in a dynamic multi-period
stochastic framework with regime switching. The risk preferences are of exponential (CARA)
type with an absolute coefficient of risk aversion which changes with the regime. The market
model is incomplete and there are two risky assets: one tradable and one non-tradable. In this
context, the optimal investment strategies are time inconsistent. Consequently, the subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies are considered. The utility indifference prices of a contingent
claim written on the risky assets are computed via an indifference valuation algorithm. By
running numerical experiments, we examine how these prices vary in response to changes in
model parameters.
Keywords: Time consistency, time inconsistent control, incomplete market, utility indiffer-
ence price.
1 Introduction
One of the most important problems in mathematical finance is the valuation of contingent claims
in incomplete financial markets.
This paper studies the indifference valuation of contingent claims in a multi-period stochastic
model under regime switching. The risk preferences are of exponential type and they are allowed
to change with the regime.
∗Work supported by NSERC grant 371653-09, MITACS grant 5-26761 and the NSFC grant 10901086.
The problem of pricing contingent claims by utility indifference in an incomplete binomial
model was studied in [7] and [8]. The work of [7] constructs a probabilistic iterative algorithm to
obtain utility indifference prices of contingent claims. This algorithm at each step consists of a
nonlinear pricing functional which is applied to prices obtained at the earlier steps. This functional
is represented in terms of risk aversion and a special martingale measure. In [8], a more general
model is considered, with an stochastic factor which may affect the transition probabilities and
the contingent claim’s payoff. Two pricing algorithms are proposed in this paper to produce
the utility indifference prices. They employ two martingale measures: the minimal martingale
measure and the minimal entropy measure. This paper also analyses the dependence of the utility
indifference prices on the choice of the trading horizon.
Our paper proposes a model with regime switching. Recently, many papers considered the
pricing of contingent claims on regime switching market. Here we recall only two such works,
[6] and [5]. In [6], the author considers a stock price model which allows for the drift and the
volatility coefficients to switch according to two-states. This market is incomplete, but it is
completed with new securities. In [5] the problem of option pricing is considered in a model
where the risky underlying assets are driven by Markov-modulated Geometric Brownian motions.
A regime switching Esscher transform is used to find a martingale pricing measure.
The novelty our model brings is the change in risk preference during the investemnt horizon.
The issue of loss aversion changing with time was addressed in financial economic literature. For
instance, [1] considers a model in which the loss aversion depends on prior gains and losses, so it
may change through time. We choose to model this effect by allowing the risk aversion to change
between two exponential type utilities according to the two states of the market (bull and bear).
In a bull market we expect investors to be willing to take more risk and this is modeled by a lower
coefficient of relative risk aversion as compared with the bear market.
This type of risk preferences lead to time inconsistent investemnt strategies. That is, an
investor may have an incentive to deviate from the optimal strategies that he/she computed at
some past time. To deal with this issue, [2] developed a theory for stochastic control problems
which are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle.
Inspired by [3] and [4], the work of [2] introduced the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies
in a discrete time model. These strategies are optimal to be implemented in the next time interval
given that they are optimal in the future. In dealing with the problem of time consistency we
choose the approach proposed by [2].
Our paper proposes an indifference valuation algorithm for pricing contingent claims in a
discrete time incomplete market with regime switching. At each step, the pricing functional
depends on the risk aversion, a martingale measure (the minimal martingale measure) and a
process which keeps track of the previous optimal wealth levels. In the special case of non-
switching preferences our results recover some of the results of [8]. Moreover, in this case we show
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that the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies coincide with the optimal ones.
The goal of this paper is to understand the impact a change in risk aversion has on prices of
contingent claims. We see in times of financial crises (bear markets) big changes in prices and we
try to explain it by an increase in investor’s risk aversion. We run numerical experiments which
show that an increase of 20% in risk aversion leads to an increase in prices anywhere between 7%
and 23%.
The mathematics we use to prove our results relies on a special form of optimality principle
applied to a sequence of optimization problems (one for each time period). This involves the
construction of a sequence of one period BS∆Es (one for each optimization problem). The terminal
value of a BS∆E was computed in a previous time step. For the special case of non-switching
preferences, these one period BS∆Es couple in one multiperiod BS∆E. In the first step we express
the equilibrium strategies and utility indifference prices in terms of these BS∆Es. In a second
step, due to the special structure of our model, we manage to get formulas which depend only on
risk aversion, the minimal martingale measure and a special process ( defined through the values
of optimal wealth process at antecedent time steps).
By the best of our knowledge this paper is the first work to address the indifference valuation
in regime switching incomplete market with regime switching preferences.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 introduces the
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies and the indifference valuation algorithm. In Section 4 we
present the numerical experiments. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of the results are delegated to an
appendix.
2 The model
In this paper we consider a multi-period stochastic model of investment. The randomness is
driven by a two dimensional discrete time random walk and a Markov chain. Let (b1, b2) :=
(b1tn , b
2
tn
)n=0,1,...,∞, be a two-dimensional binomial random walk on a complete probability space
(Ω,F , {Ftn},P). The random walk is assumed symmetric under P in the sense that
P(∆bitn = ±1) = 1/2, i = 1, 2. (1)
Here ∆ is the difference operator, i.e.,
∆btn := btn+1 − btn .
A discrete time finite state homogeneous Markov chain (MC) J := (Jtn)n=0,1,...,∞ is defined on
(Ω,F , {Ftn},P) and it takes values in the state space S = {0,1}. The n−step transition matrix
P (n) = (P
(n)
ij ), is defined by
P
(n)
ij := P(Jtn = j|Jt0 = i), i, j = 0,1 n = 0, 1, ...,∞,
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where P
(0)
ij = 1 when i = j, otherwise P
(0)
ij = 0. We assume that the distribution of J0 is known,
and
P(J0 = i|FS0 ) = P(J0 = i), i = 0,1.
The filtration {Ftn} is generated by the random walk (b1, b2) and (MC) J. The two dimensional
process S = (S1, S2) is referred to as the forward process.
There are two securities available for trading, a riskless bond and a risky stock. The trading
horizon is [0, T ], with T a exogenous finite horizon. We take the bond as numeraire, thus it can
be assumed to offer zero interest rate. There are N + 1 trading dates: t = 0, h, ..., Nh, with
{0, h, ..., Nh} a partition of the interval [0, T ]. Here h = T/N, and tn = nh, for n = 0, 1, · · · , N.
The stock price process S1 := {S1t ; t = 0, h . . . , (N − 1)h,Nh}, follows the difference equation:
∆S1tn = S
1
tn
(µ1tnh+ σ
1
tn
√
h∆b1tn), n = 0, 1 . . . , N − 1,
S10 = s
1 > 0,
(2)
for some adapted drift process µ1 := {µ1t ; t = 0, h . . . , (N − 1)h,Nh} and volatility process σ1 :=
{σ1t ; t = 0, h . . . , (N − 1)h,Nh} which are chosen so that the stock price remains positive.
In this model we assume the existence of a non-traded asset S2t = {S2t ; t = 0, h . . . , (N −
1)h,Nh}, which follows the difference equation :
∆S2tn = S
2
tn
(µ2tnh+ σ
2
tn
√
hρ(∆b1tn +
√
1− ρ2∆b2tn)), n = 0, 1 . . . , N − 1,
S20 = s
2 > 0,
(3)
for some adapted drift process µ2 := {µ2t ; t = 0, h . . . , (N − 1)h,Nh}, volatility process σ2 :=
{σ2t ; t = 0, h . . . , (N − 1)h,Nh}, and the correlation coefficient ρ, with |ρ| ≤ 1.
2.1 Trading strategies
An investor in this model starts with initial wealth X0 = x ∈ R and trades between the stock
and the bond, following self-financing strategies. Let αtn ∈ Ftn be the wealth invested in stock
at time tn, n = 0, 1 . . . , N − 1. The wealth process is governed by the self-financing equation
∆Xαtn := αtn(µ
1
tn
h+ σ1tn
√
h∆b1tn). (4)
The state space of the (MC) J is S = {0,1}, and it is assumed to model two states of the economy:
0 the good state (bull market), 1 represents the bad state (bear market). The investor’s risk
preference is assumed to change according to the current state of the market
U(x, j) = − exp(−γ(j)x)
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where γ(j), j ∈ {0,1} is the positive coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The performance of
an investment strategy is measured by the above expected utility criterion applied to the final
wealth associated with an investment strategy. The maximal expected utility is given by the value
function
vtn(x, j) = sup
α∈Πtn
EP(−e−γ(j)XαT |Ftn). (5)
Here n = 0, 1 . . . , N − 1, XαT is given by (4), Xαtn = x, Jtn = j, and Πtn denotes the set of
admissible trading strategies defined by
Πtn := {αn, αn+1, · · · , αN−1 : αk ∈ Ftk , such that EP|Xαtk | <∞, k = n, n+ 1 . . . N − 1}. (6)
2.2 A special martingale measure
Define a probability measures Q on (Ω,F , {Ftn}) such that (b1, b2) is a two dimensional random
walk under Q, and the following equalities holds:
Q(∆b1tn = 1|Ftn) =
1− θ1tn
√
h
2
, Q(∆b1tn = −1|Ftn) =
1 + θ1tn
√
h
2
, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
Q(∆b2tn = ±1|Ftn) =
1
2
, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
Q(Jtn = j|Jt0 = i) = P(Jtn = j|Jt0 = i) = P (n)ij i, j ∈ S, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
Here θ1tn , defined by
θ1tn :=
µ1tn
σ1tn
, (7)
is the market price of risk (MPR) for the stock. We choose (MPR) θ1 such that the probability
measure Q is well defined, i.e.,
1√
h
≥ θ1tn ≥ 0.
Expectation under probability measure Q will be denoted by EQ[·]. Under Q the stock price
process S1 is a martingale, thus we can call Q a martingale measure. In fact this martingale
measure is related to the minimal martingale measure and the minimal entropy measure (see [8]
). The following Lemma is a consequence of the fact P and Q place the same probability weights
on b2.
Lemma 2.1. For every n = 0, 1, ...N − 1, the following identity holds
Q(S2tn+1 |FS
1
tn+1
∨
Ftn) = P(S2tn+1 |FS
1
tn+1
∨
Ftn).
The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
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3 Indifference valuation algorithms
We consider a contingent claim written on (S1, S2) to be priced in this model. For simplicity it
is assumed that its payoff is of the form F (S1T , S
2
T ), and is to be paid at time T, with F being
a measurable function. Let λ ≥ 0 be given. The writer of λ shares of the claim with payoff
F (S1T , S
2
T ), faces the following optimization problem at time tn ∈ [0, T ]; given the initial forward
process Stn = s = (s
1, s2), the market state Jtn = i and the initial endowment Xtn = x, the writer
of the option seeks an admissible trading strategy α¯ := (α¯k)k=n,n+1,...,N−1 such that
α¯ = arg sup
α∈Πtn
EP[− exp(−γ(i)(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))|Xtn = x, Jtn = i, Stn = s]. (8)
This optimization problem is time inconsistent due to the fact that the risk preference is
changing according to the (MC) J. Indeed the optimal strategy computed at time t0 may fail to
remain optimal at a later time tn, in the sense of (8), if Jtn 6= Jt0 . One way out of this predicament
is to consider the game theoretical approach introduced by [2]. In order to ease notations, let us
denote
Etn [·] := EP[·|Xtn = x, Jtn = i, Stn = s], EPtn [·|G] := E[·|G
∨
{Xtn = x, Stn = s, Jtn = i}]
E
Q
tn
[·] := EQ[·|Xtn = x, Jtn = i, Stn = s], EQtn [·|G] := EQ[·|G
∨
{Xtn = x, Stn = s, Jtn = i}],
for every G ⊂ F .
3.1 The game theoretical approach
Since optimal trading strategies are not defined within our context, we search for subgame perfect
strategies. This is done by backward induction. First we consider the time period [(N − 1)h,Nh]
(recall that Nh = T ). At time (N − 1)h the writer of λ shares of claim solve the optimization
problem
(P1) V λN−1(x, i, s) = sup
α∈ΠtN−1
EtN−1 [− exp(−γ(i)(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))], (9)
and this is refer to as problem (P1). In our model sup in (P1) is attained and we denote
α̂λN−1 := arg max
α∈ΠtN−1
E[− exp(−γ(JtN−1)(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))|FtN−1 ]. (10)
Notice that in this first step we solve a pure optimization problem. On the time period [(N −
2)h,Nh] one seeks subgame perfect equilibrium strategies as follows. Let the trading strategies α
be of the form:
αk =

α̂λk , for k = N − 1,
αλk , for k = N − 2,
(11)
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for an arbitrary FtN−2− adapted control αλN−2 such that (αλN−2, αˆλN−1) ∈ ΠtN−2 . The equilibrium
value function is defined by
(P2) V λN−2(x, i, s) := sup
α∈ΠtN−2
EtN−2 [− exp(−γ(i)(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))], (12)
and this optimization problem is refer to as problem (P2). In our model sup in (P2) is attained
and we denote by
(α̂λN−2, α̂
λ
N−1) := arg max
α∈ΠtN−2
E[− exp(−γ(JtN−2)(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))|FtN−2 ], (13)
the equilibrium strategy at tN−2. Further we proceed iteratively. On the time period [(N −
n)h,Nh] one restricts to trading strategies α of the form:
αk =

α̂λk , for k = N − (n− 1), N − (n− 2), · · · , N − 1,
αλk for k = N − n,
(14)
for an arbitrary FtN−n− adapted control αλN−n such that (αλN−n, αˆλk){k=N−n+1,··· ,N−1} ∈ ΠtN−n .
The equilibrium value function is defined by
(Pn) V λN−n(x, i, s) := sup
α∈ΠtN−n
EtN−n [− exp(−γ(i)(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))]. (15)
The sup in (Pn) is attained and we denote by
(α̂λN−n, α̂
λ
N−n+1, · · · , α̂λN−1) := arg max
α∈ΠtN−n
E[− exp(−γ(JtN−n )(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))|FtN−n ], (16)
the equilibrium strategy at tN−n. Having clarified the choice of equilibrium trading strategies,
one can turn to pricing of the claim. This is done by utility indifference; more precisely we have
below the following formal definition.
Definition 3.1. The writer’s indifference price at time tN−n of the claim with payoff λF (S1T , S
2
T )
is the following Markov process
pλtN−n = G
λ(tN−n,XαtN−n , JtN−n , StN−n),
where the function Gλ(tN−n, x, i, s) is given by the equation
V λN−n(x+G
λ(tN−n, x, i, s), i, s) = V 0N−n(x, i, s). (17)
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Thus, the indifference price is the extra wealth that makes the option writer indifferent between
writing and not writing the claim. In order to find the indifference price at time tN−n one,
according to equation (17), has to find the equilibrium value function V λN−n(x, i, s). Consequently
we have to solve the problems (P1), (P2), · · · , (Pn). Let us start with (P1). Here we have the
following result.
Theorem 3.1. The equilibrium trading strategy for problem (P1) is given by the following equa-
tions
αˆλN−1 = αˆ
0
N−1 +H
λ(tN−1,XtN−1 , JtN−1 , StN−1), (18)
with
α̂0N−1 =
1
2γ(JtN−1)σ
1
tN−1
√
h
log
(
1 + θtN−1
√
h
1− θtN−1
√
h
)
,
and
Hλ(tN−1, x, i, s) =
1
hµ1tN−1γ(i)
[
EtN−1 [logE
Q
tN−1 [e
λγ(i)F (S1T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN ]] (19)
− EQtN−1 [logE
Q
tN−1 [e
λγ(i)F (S1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN ]]
]
.
Moreover, the indifference price at time tN−1, pλtN−1 is given by
pλtN−1 = G
λ(tN−1,XtN−1 , JtN−1 , StN−1), (20)
where
Gλ(tN−1, x, i, s) =
1
γ(i)
E
Q
tN−1
[
logEQtN−1 [e
λγ(i)F (S1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN ]
]
. (21)
Proof of this Theorem is done in Appendix A.

Next we look at the special case when γ(0) = γ(1) = γ, that is, the preference of the investor
doesn’t change with the market state. Here we have the following result.
Corollary 3.2. The indifference price pλtN−1 is increasing in coefficient of risk aversion γ.
Proof of this Corollary is done in Appendix B.

Let us move to problem (P2). Here, the presentation of the results could be omitted and one
can directly state the results for (Pn). We choose not to do so in order to ease the reading of
the manuscript. The following result provides the indifference price and the equilibrium trading
strategy.
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Theorem 3.3. The equilibrium trading strategy for problem (P2) is given by the following equa-
tions
αˆλN−2 = αˆ
0
N−2 +H
λ(tN−2,XtN−2 , JtN−2 , StN−2),
with
α̂0N−2 =
1
2γ(JtN−2)σ
1
tN−2
√
h
log
(
1 + θtN−2
√
h
1− θtN−2
√
h
)
,
and
Hλ(tN−2, x, i, s) =
1
hµ1tN−2γ(i)
[
EtN−2 [logE
Q
tN−2 [Λ
λ
tN−1e
λγ(i)F (S1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN−1 ]] (22)
− EQtN−2 [logEQtN−2 [ΛλtN−1eλγ(i)F (S
1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN−1 ]]
]
,
where ΛλtN−1 is (later) defined in (24). Moreover, the indifference price at time tN−2, p
λ
tN−2 is
given by
pλtN−2 = G
λ(tN−2,XtN−2 , JtN−2 , StN−2),
with
Gλ(tN−2, x, i, s) =
1
γ(i)
E
Q
tN−2
[
logEQtN−2 [Λ
λ
tN−1e
λγ(i)F (S1T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN−1 ]
]
. (23)
This Theorem is a special case of Theorem 3.4.

Let us consider the general case, that is the problem (Pn). Here, we need to introduce the
following process (ΛλtN−k ) defined by
ΛλtN−k :=
e
−γ(JtN−k−1 )
N−1∑
j=N−k
∆Xαˆ
λ
tj
EtN−k−1
e
−γ(JtN−k−1 )
N−1∑
j=N−k
∆Xαˆ
0
tj

, k = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, (24)
where the equilibrium strategies (αˆλk){k=N−n+1···N−1} were determined from solving the problems
(P1), (P2), . . . , P (n − 1). The following Theorem is the main result of our paper.
Theorem 3.4. The equilibrium trading strategy for problem (Pn) is given by the equations
αˆλN−n = αˆ
0
N−n +H
λ(tN−n,XtN−n , JtN−n , StN−n),
9
with
α̂0N−n =
1
2γ(JtN−n )σ
1
tN−n
√
h
log
(
1 + θtN−n
√
h
1− θtN−n
√
h
)
,
and
Hλ(tN−n, x, i, s) =
1
hµ1tN−nγ(i)
[
EtN−n [logE
Q
tN−n [Λ
λ
tN−n+1e
λγ(i)F (S1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN−n+1 ]] (25)
− EQtN−n [logEQtN−n [ΛλtN−n+1eλγ(i)F (S
1
T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN−n+1 ]]
]
,
where ΛλtN−n+1 is defined in (24). Moreover, the indifference price at time tN−n, p
λ
tN−n is given
by
pλtN−n = G
λ(tN−n,XtN−n , JtN−n , StN−n),
with
Gλ(tN−n, x, i, s) =
1
γ(i)
E
Q
tN−n
[
logEQtN−n [Λ
λ
tN−n+1e
λγ(i)F (S1T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN−n+1 ]
]
, (26)

Proof of this Theorem is done in Appendix C.

3.2 The case of constant CARA
Next we look at the special case when γ(0) = γ(1) = γ. In this special case, the equilibrium
strategies coincide with the optimal ones. Formally, we have the following results.
Corollary 3.5. Let us define the following value function:
V¯ λn (x, i, s) := sup
α∈ΠtN−n
EtN−n [− exp(−γ(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))]. (27)
The sup in (27) is attained and let
(α¯λN−n, α¯
λ
N−n+1, · · · , α¯λN−1) = arg max
α∈ΠtN−n
EtN−n [− exp(−γ(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))], (28)
be the optimal strategy at tN−n. Then for every n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1,
α¯λn = α̂
λ
n.
Proof of this Corollary is done in Appendix D.

10
The next result provides a simple iterative scheme to compute the indifference price.
Corollary 3.6. The following recurrence relationship between pλtN−n and p
λ
tN−n+1 holds:
pλtN−n =
1
γ
EQ
[
logE[e
γpλtN−n+1 |FtN−n
∨
FS1tN−n+1 ]
∣∣∣∣FtN−n].
Moreover, the indifference price pλtN−n is increasing in γ.
Proof of this Corollary is done in Appendix E.

This result was proved in [8] for a market model in which the randomness is given by a two
dimensional random walk.
4 Numerical examples
In this section we present a numerical example of our multi-period indifference pricing model with
regime switching. We consider an European call option on the non-traded asset with a strike price
K = 10. We consider the following numerical values N = 365, T = 1, S10 = 10, S
2
0 = 10, ρ =
0.2, µ2 = 0.1, σ2 = 0.50. The transition matrix is
P (1) =
[
0.6 0.4
0.6 0.4
]
.
In the first step we want to understand the impact a change in risk aversion has on the
indifference price. Thus, we assume that in a bull market the risk aversion is γ and in a bear
market there is an increase of 20% so that the risk aversion is 1.2× γ.
Fig 4.1 plots the percentage change in the indifference price with the reference point being the
indifference price of a model without regime switching (neither for risk aversion nor for market
coefficients). We consider that the initial state is either bear market or bull market (the two
situations are labeled on the plot). The model parameters are µ1 = 0.1, σ1 = 0.2.
Next we explore the effect the change in stock’s mean rate of return has on the indifference
price. Thus, in a bull market the stock’s mean rate of return is a constant µ1 and in a bear market
there is a decrease by 0.2 so it is µ1 − 0.2.
Fig 4.2 plots the percentage change in the indifference price with the reference point being the
indifference price of a model without regime switching (neither for risk aversion nor for market
coefficients). We consider that the initial state is either bear market or bull market (the two
situations are labeled on the plot). The model parameters are γ = 0.6, σ1 = 0.2.
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Finally, we want to see the effect the change in stock’s volatility has on the indifference price.
Thus, in a bull market the stock’s volatility is a constant σ1 and in a bear market there is a
increase by 0.2 so it is σ1 + 0.2.
Fig 4.3 plots the percentage change in the indifference price with the reference point being the
indifference price of a model without regime switching (neither for risk aversion nor for market
coefficients). We consider that the initiate state is either bear market or bull market (the two
situations are labeled on the plot). The model parameters are γ = 0.6, σ1 = 0.1.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a multi-period stochastic model with regime switching. A Markov chain
which takes two possible values ( which are thought of as the two states of markets: bull and
bear) drives the regime switching. This together with a two dimensional random walk generates
the randomness of the model. In this model there is a riskless asset (bond) and two risky assets
(a stock and a non-tradable asset). This market model is incomplete, since there are more sources
of uncertainty than tradable assets. The risky assets have stochastic mean rate of return and
volatility which can change with the state of the market. The risk preference can also change
with the state of the market. However in each state, utility is of exponential type with constant
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Due to the change in risk preference, the optimal investment
strategies are time inconsistent in this model. Indeed, the optimal investment strategies computed
at a given time may fail to remain optimal at later times if the risk preferences are changing. In
order to overcome this predicament the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are introduced.
They are computed iteratively by an algorithm. The goal of this paper is to price within this
model a contingent claim written on both the stock and the non-tradable asset. Since the market
is incomplete this can not be done by a replicating portfolio argument. Therefore, we have chosen
the utility indifference approach. Thus, utility indifference prices of this contingent claim are
computed via a recursive algorithm (the same algorithm that produces the equilibrium strategies).
By running numerical experiments we wanted to understand what is the percentage change in
price if some model parameters are changing. For example we found that the utility indifference
price will increase by a percenatge anywhere in between 7% and 23% if the market was initially in
a bear (bad) state, so the coefficient of risk aversion γ increased by 20% (this change is recorded
for all values of γ ∈ [0.1, 1]).
6 Appendix
6.1 Backward Finite Difference Equations (BS∆E)
For an arbitrary n = 0, 1, · · · , N let us consider the BS∆E of the form
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ytN−n = ytN−n+1 + f(tN−n, StN−n , JtN−n , ztN−n)h−
√
hztN−n∆btN−n , (29)
where ytN−n+1 is given and it is FStN−n+1
∨FJtN−n measurable. Here z = (z1, z2, z3), and ∆b =
(∆b1,∆b2,∆b3) with
∆b3tk =
{
1, if ∆b1tk∆b
2
tk
= −1,
−1, if ∆b1tk∆b2tk = 1.
The following Lemma is a consequence of the Predictable Representation Theorem.
Lemma 6.1. The BS∆E (29) has a unique FtN−n measurable solution (ytN−n , ztN−n ). It is given
by
ztN−n =
1√
h
E[ytN−n+1∆btN−n |FtN−n ], (30)
ytN−n = E[ytN−n+1 + f(tN−n, StN−n , JtN−n , ztN−n)h|FtN−n ].
6.2 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let (Y 1,λtN−1 , Z
1,λ
tN−1) be the FtN−1 solution of the following BS∆E:

Y 1,λtN−1 = Y
1,λ
tN
+ f(tN−1, StN−1 , JtN−1 , Z
1,λ
tN−1)h−
√
hZ1,λtN−1∆btN−1 ,
Y 1,λtN := λF (S
1
T , S
2
T ),
(31)
for some function f(tN−1, ·) to be chosen later on. This solution is known to exist according to
Lemma 6.1. Next we want to construct a process Mαtn of the form
Mαtn = − exp(−γ(JtN−1)(Xαtn − Y 1,λtn )), n = N − 1, N. (32)
Moreover it satisfies the suboptimality/optimality principle
suboptimality E[MαtN |FtN−1 ] ≤MαtN−1 for all α ∈ ΠtN−1 , (33)
optimality E[M αˆ
λ
tN
|FtN−1 ] =M αˆ
λ
tN−1 for some αˆ
λ ∈ ΠtN−1 . (34)
Once this program is accomplished, it is easy to see that
α̂λN−1 = arg max
α∈ΠtN−1
E[− exp(−γ(JtN−1)(XαT − λF (S1T , S2T ))|FtN−1 ]. (35)
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Indeed, from (32), (33) and (34) it follows that
EtN−1 [− exp(−γ(i)(XαtN − Y
1,λ
tN
))] ≤ EtN−1 [− exp(−γ(i)(XαtN−1 − Y
1,λ
tN−1))] (36)
= EtN−1 [− exp(−γ(i)(Xα̂
λ
tN−1 − Y
1,λ
tN−1))]
= EtN−1 [− exp(−γ(i)(Xα̂
λ
tN
− Y 1,λtN ))]
= V λN−1(x, i, s). (37)
In the light of (33) and (34)
EtN−1 [exp(−γ(i)[(XαtN −XαtN−1)− (Y
1,λ
tN
− Y 1,λtN−1)] ≥ 1, (38)
with equality if α = α̂λN−1. Moreover by (4) and (31) it follows that
EtN−1
[
exp(−γ(i)[(XαtN −XαtN−1)− (Y
1,λ
tN
− Y 1,λtN−1)])
]
= e−γ(i)f(tN−1 ,s,i,z
α)h · gN−1(α, s, i, zα). (39)
Here zλ = (Z1,λtN−1 |XtN−1 = x, StN−1 = s, JtN−1 = i), and
gN−1(α, s, i, zα) := EtN−1
[
e
−γ(i)α(µ1tN−1h+σ
1
tN−1
√
h∆b1tN−1 ) · eγ(i)
√
hzα∆btN−1
]
=
1
2
e
−γ(i)α(µ1tN−1h+σ
1
tN−1
√
h)
EtN−1
[
eγ(i)
√
hzα∆btN−1 |FS1tN
⋂
AtN−1
]
+
1
2
e
−γ(i)α(µ1tN−1h−σ
1
tN−1
√
h)
EtN−1
[
eγ(i)
√
hzα∆btN−1 |FS1tN
⋂
ActN−1
]
,
with Atk := {∆b1tk = 1} and Actk := {∆b1tk = −1}. Direct computations show that the function
α→ gN−1(α, s, i, zα) is convex, so its minimum is given by the first order condition (FOC). From
the FOC we obtain the following trading strategy
αˆλN−1 =
1
2γ(JtN−1)σ
1
tN−1
√
h
log
(
1 + θtN−1
√
h
1− θtN−1
√
h
)
(40)
+
1
2γ(JtN−1)σ
1
tN−1
√
h
log
(
E[e
γ(JtN−1 )
√
hZ
1,λ
tN−1∆btN−1 |FS1tN
∨FtN−1 ⋂AtN−1 ]
E[e
γ(JtN−1 )
√
hZ
1,λ
tN−1∆btN−1 |FS1tN
∨FtN−1 ⋂ActN−1 ]
)
.
Next we choose f(tN−1, ·) such that
e
−γ(JtN−1 )f(tN−1 ,StN−1 ,JtN−1 ,Z
1,λ
tN−1 )h gN−1(αˆλN−1, StN−1 , JtN−1 , Z
1,λ
tN−1) = 1. (41)
Therefore, by (38) and (39), it follows that αˆλN−1 is the equilibrium trading strategy, i.e., α¯
λ
N−1 =
αˆλN−1. Next we want to elaborate more on (40). Notice that by taking conditional expectation on
(31), one gets √
hZ1,λtN−1∆btN−1 = λF (S
1
T , S
2
T )− λE[F (S1T , S2T )|FtN−1 ]. (42)
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By plugging this in (40) it follows that
EtN−1 [e
γ(i)
√
hZ
1,λ
tN−1∆btN−1 |FS1tN
⋂
AtN−1 ] = EtN−1 [e
γ(i)λF (S1T ,S
2
T ) · e−γ(i)E[λF (S1T ,S2T )|FtN−1 ]|FS1tN
⋂
AtN−1 ]
= e−γ(i)E[λF (S
1
T
,S2
T
)|FtN−1 ] · EtN−1 [eγ(i)λF (S
1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN
⋂
AtN−1 ].
Consequently after some trivial manipulations, and by Lemma 2.1, it follows that the equilibrium
strategy can be expressed as
αˆλN−1 =
1
2γ(JtN−1)σ
1
tN−1
√
h
log
(
1 + θtN−1
√
h
1− θtN−1
√
h
)
(43)
+
1
2γ(JtN−1)σ
1
tN−1
√
h
log
(
EQ[eγ(JtN−1 )λF (S
1
T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN
∨FtN−1 ⋂AtN−1 ]
EQ[eγ(JtN−1 )λF (S
1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN
∨FtN−1 ⋂ActN−1 ]
)
.
This, combined with the definition of Q imply (18). Let us now turn to the indifference price
pλtN−n . It follows from (37) that
V λN−1(x, i, s) = e
−γ(i)(x−Y 1,λtN−1 ). (44)
Moreover from the definition of the indifference price pλtN−n (see (17)) it follows that
pλtN−1 = Y
1,λ
tN−1 − Y
1,0
tN−1 (45)
= E[λF (S1T , S
2
T )|FtN−1 ] + f(tN−1, StN−1 , JtN−1 , Z1,λtN−1)h− f(tN−1, StN−1 , JtN−1 , Z
1,0
tN−1)h,
where the second equality comes from (31). To proceed further with the computations we need
the expression of f(tN−1, ·). From (41) we get that
f(tN−1, s, i, zλ) = f(tN−1, s, i, z0) +
1
γ(i)h
E
Q
tN−1 [logEtN−1 [e
γ(i)
√
hzλ∆btN−1 |FS1tN ]], (46)
and
f(tN−1, s, i, z0) =
1
2
[(
1 + θtN−1
√
h
1− θtN−1
√
h
)− 1+θtN−1√h
2
+
(
1 + θtN−1
√
h
1− θtN−1
√
h
) 1−θtN−1√h
2
]
. (47)
Pluging (46) and (47) into (45) and making use of (42) we obtain (20) and (21).

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6.3 Appendix B: Proof of Corollary 3.2
Let us assume that 0 < γ1 < γ2; the following result
E
Q
tN−1 [e
λγ1F (S1T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN ] ≤ EQtN−1 [eλγ2F (S
1
T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN ]
γ1
γ2 ,
comes from Ho¨lder’s inequality. Taking log in both sides we get
1
γ1
logEQtN−1 [e
λγ1F (S1T ,S
2
T
)|FS1tN ] ≤
1
γ2
logEQtN−1 [e
λγ2F (S1T ,S
2
T
)|FS1tN ].
Next, take expectation with respect to the measure Q, and the result yields.

6.4 Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3.4
Let Y n,λtN−n+1 be defined by
e
γ(JtN−n )Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 := E
[
e
−γ(JtN−n )
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
· eλγ(JtN−n )F (S1T ,S2T )|FStN−n+1
∨
FJtN−n
]
, (48)
where {αˆλk}k=N−n+1···N−1 was determined from the problems (P1), (P2), . . . , P (n−1). Let (Y n,λ, Zn,λ)
be the solution of the following BS∆E
Y n,λtN−n = Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 + f(tN−n, StN−n , JtN−n , Z
n,λ
tN−n)h−
√
hZn,λtN−n∆btN−n , (49)
for some function f(tN−n, ·) to be specified later. It is easy to see that
√
hZn,λtN−n∆btN−n = Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 − E[Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 |FtN−n ]. (50)
As in (P1), we construct construct a process Mαtk of the form
Mαtk = − exp(−γ(JtN−n)(Xαtk − Y
n,λ
tk
), k = N − n,N − n+ 1. (51)
Moreover it satisfies the suboptimality/optimality principle
suboptimality E[MαtN−n+1 |FtN−n ] ≤MαtN−n for all αλN−n such that (52)
(αλN−n, αˆ
λ
k){k=N−n+1,··· ,N−1} ∈ ΠtN−n ,
optimality E[M αˆ
λ
tN−n+1 |FtN−n ] =M αˆ
λ
tN−n for some αˆ
λ
N−n such that (53)
(αˆλN−n, αˆ
λ
k){k=N−n+1,··· ,N−1} ∈ ΠtN−n .
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Then, we claim that αˆλN−n is an equilibrium strategy, i.e.,
(α̂λN−n+1, · · · , α̂λN−1) = arg max
(αλ
N−n,αˆ
λ
k
){k=N−n+1···N−1}∈ΠtN−n
E[− exp(−γ(JtN−n )(XαT−λF (S1T , S2T ))|FtN−n ].
Here
XαT := X
α
tN−n+1 +
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
, XαˆT := X
αˆ
tN−n+1 +
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
.
Indeed, by applying iterated conditional expectation property and suboptimality/optimality prin-
ciple we get
EtN−n [−e−γ(i)(X
α
T−λF (S1T ,S2T ))] =
EtN−n [−e−γ(i)X
α
tN−n+1 · E[e
−γ(i)
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
· eλγ(i)F (S1T ,S2T )|FStN−n+1
∨
FJtN−n ]] =
EtN−n [−e
−γ(i)(XαtN−n+1−Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 )] ≤
[−e−γ(i)(XαtN−n−Y
n,λ
tN−n )] =
[−e−γ(i)(XαˆtN−n−Y
n,λ
tN−n )] =
EtN−n [−e
−γ(i)(XαˆtN−n+1−Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 )] =
EtN−n [−e−γ(i)X
αˆ
tN−n+1 · E[e
−γ(i)
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
· eλγ(i)F (S1T ,S2T )|FStN−n+1
∨
FJtN−n ]] =
EtN−n [−e−γ(i)(X
αˆ
T−λF (S1T ,S2T ))].
Thus, α̂λN−n is the desired equilinrium strategy on (N − n)h. Recall that
EtN−n [exp(−γ(i)[(XαtN−n+1 −XαtN−n)− (Y n,λtN−n+1 − Y
n,λ
tN−n)]] ≥ 1,
with equality if and only if αN−n = α̂λN−n. By making use of (50) and doing similar computations
as in the case of (P1), leads to
αˆλN−n =
1
2γ(JtN−n )σ
1
tN−n
√
h
log
(
1 + θtN−n
√
h
1− θtN−n
√
h
)
(54)
+
1
2γ(JtN−n )σ
1
tN−n
√
h
log
(
EQ[e
γ(JtN−n )Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1
∨FtN−n ⋂AtN−n ]
EQ[e
γ(JtN−n )Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1
∨FtN−n ⋂ActN−n ]
)
.
From the definitions of Y n,λtN−n+1(see (48)) and Q, after some trivial manipulations, (25) yields.
Following the same argument as in (P1) one gets f(tN−n, ·) to be
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f(tN−n, s, i, zλ) = f(tN−n, s, i, z0) +
1
γ(i)h
E
Q
tN−n [logEtN−n [e
γ(i)
√
hzλ∆btN−n |FS1tN−n+1 ]], (55)
and
f(tN−n, s, i, z0) =
1
2
[(
1 + θtN−n
√
h
1− θtN−n
√
h
)− 1+θtN−n√h
2
+
(
1 + θtN−n
√
h
1− θtN−n
√
h
) 1−θtN−n√h
2
]
. (56)
Furthermore, as in (P1) we get
pλtN−n = Y
n,λ
tN−n − Y
n,0
tN−n . (57)
Consequently pλtN−n = G
λ(tN−n,XtN−n , JtN−n , StN−n), where
Gλ(tN−n, x, i, s) = E[Y
n,λ
tN−n+1 − Y
n,0
tN−n+1 |FtN−n ] + f(tN−n, x, s, i, zλ)h− f(tN−n, x, s, i, z0)h
=
1
γ(i)
E
Q
tN−n log(
EtN−n [e
γ(i)Y n,λtN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1 ]
EtN−n [e
γ(i)Y n,0tN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1 ]
) (58)
=
1
γ(i)
E
Q
tN−n log
EtN−n
[
e
−γ(i)
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
eλγ(i)F (S
1
T
,S2
T
)
∣∣∣∣FS1tN−n+1]
EtN−n
[
e
−γ(i)
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
0
tk ]
=
1
γ(i)
E
Q
tN−n logEtN−n

e
−γ(i)
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
EtN−n
[
e
−γ(i)
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
0
tk ]
· eλγ(i)F (S1T ,S2T )
∣∣∣∣FS1tN−n+1

=
1
γ(i)
EQtN−n
[
logEtN−n [Λ
λ
tN−n+1e
λγ(i)F (S1
T
,S2
T
)|FS1tN−n+1 ]
]
=
1
γ(i)
E
Q
tN−n
[
logEQtN−n [Λ
λ
tN−n+1e
λγ(i)F (S1T ,S
2
T )|FS1tN−n+1 ]
]
, (59)
Here, the first equality follows from (49) and (55). The second equality follows from (50). The
third equality follows from
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
0
tk
being independent of FS1tN−n+1 , and from the definition
of Y n,λtN−n+1(see (48)). Therefore (26) holds.

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6.5 Appendix D: Proof of Corollary 3.5
We use mathematical induction to prove the corollary. It is obvious that
α̂λN−1 = α¯
λ
N−1.
The induction hypothesis is that
α̂λk = α¯
λ
k , k = (N − 1), (N − 2), · · · , (N − n+ 1).
Next, we have to show that
α¯λN−n = αˆ
λ
N−n. (60)
According to Dynamic Programming Principle
(P¯ n) V¯ λN−n(x, i, s) := sup
α∈ΠtN−n
EtN−n [V¯N−n+1(XN−n+1, JN−n+1, SN−n+1)]. (61)
From (27) and induction hypothesis it follows that
EtN−n [V¯N−n+1(XN−n+1, JN−n+1, SN−n+1)] = EtN−n [−e
−γXαtN−n+1 · e
−γ
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xα¯
λ
tk
· eλγF (S1T ,S2T )]
= EtN−n [−e−γX
α
tN−n · e−γα(µ1tN−nh+σ1tN−n
√
h∆b1tN−n ) · e
−γ
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xα¯
λ
tk
· eλγF (S1T ,S2T )]
= EtN−n [−e−γX
α
tN−n · e−γα(µ1tN−nh+σ1tN−n
√
h∆b1tN−n) · e
−γ
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
· eλγF (S1T ,S2T )].
In the light of this and (61), the identitity (60) follows.

6.6 Appendix E: Proof of Corollary 3.6
From problem (P1), we know that
E[e
−γ∆XαˆλtN−1 · eγλF (S1T ,S2T )|FtN−1 ] = e
γY
1,λ
tN−1 . (62)
From the definition of Y n,λtN−n+1( with n = 2), equation (62), and from the iterated conditioning
property we get
e
γY
2,λ
tN−1 : = E[e
−γ∆XαˆλtN−1 · eγλF (S1T ,S2T )|FStN−1
∨
FJtN−2 ]
= E
[
E[e
−γ∆XαˆλtN−1 · eγλF (S1T ,S2T )|FtN−1 ]
∣∣∣∣FStN−1∨FJtN−2]
= E[e
γY
1,λ
tN−1 |FStN−1
∨
FJtN−2 ].
19
From the optimality principle and from the definition of Y n−1,λtN−n+2 if follows that
e
γY
n−1,λ
tN−n+1 = E[e
−γ∆XαˆλtN−n+1 · eγY
n−1,λ
tN−n+2 |FtN−n+1 ]
= E[e
−γ
N−1∑
k=N−n+1
∆Xαˆ
λ
tk
· eγλF (S1T ,S2T )|FtN−n+1 ]. (63)
From the definition of Y n,λtN−n+1 , equation (63), and from the iterated conditioning property we get
e
γY
n,λ
tN−n+1 = E[e
γY
n−1,λ
tN−n+1 |FStN−n+1
∨
FJtN−n ], n = 1, 2 · · ·N. (64)
Thus, by conditioning and making use of iterated conditioning property we get
E[e
γY
n,λ
tN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1
∨
FtN−n ] = E
[
E[e
γY
n−1,λ
tN−n+1 |FStN−n+1
∨
FJtN−n ]
∣∣∣∣FS1tN−n+1∨FtN−n]
= E[e
γY
n−1,λ
tN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1
∨
FtN−n ]. (65)
Therefore
pλtN−n =
1
γ
EQ[log
E[e
γY
n−1,λ
tN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1
∨FtN−n ]
E[e
γY
n−1,0
tN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1
∨FtN−n ] |FtN−n ]
=
1
γ
EQ[log
(
E[e
γ(Y n−1,λtN−n+1−Y
n−1,0
tN−n+1 )|FS1tN−n+1
∨
FtN−n ]
)
|FtN−n ]
=
1
γ
EQ[logE[e
γpλtN−n+1 |FS1tN−n+1
∨
FtN−n ]|FtN−n ].
Here the first equality comes from (58) and (65). The second equality holds due to Y n−1,0tN−n+1 ∈
FS1tN−n+1
∨FtN−n . The third equality follows from (57). The monotonocity of pλtN−n in γ follows
from Ho¨lder’s inequality and an induction argument as in the case of Corollary’s 3.2 proof.

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